The use of virtual devices in place of physical hardware is increasing in activities such as design, testing and debugging. Yet virtual devices are simply software applications, and like all software they are prone to faults. A full system simulator (FSS), is a class of virtual machine that includes a large set of virtual devices -enough to run the full target software stack. Defects in an FSS virtual device may have cascading effects as the incorrect behavior can be propagated forward to many different platforms as well as to guest programs. In this work we present VDTest, a novel framework for testing virtual devices within an FSS. VDTest begins by generating a test specification obtained through static analysis. It then employs a two-phase testing approach to test virtual components both individually and in combination. It leverages a differential oracle strategy, taking advantage of the existence of a physical or golden device to eliminate the need for manually generating test oracles. In an empirical study using both open source and commercial FSSs, we found 64 faults, 83% more than random testing.
INTRODUCTION
A full-system simulator (FSS), is a virtual machine (VM) (or software implementation) of the complete environment that executes target software on a physical machine [5, 14, 36] . Unlike process VMs or hypervisor-based systems (such as VMware) that rely on the host architecture to run the target machines [9] , an FSS encompasses a variety of virtual devices that can simulate not only the processor cores and Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
ICSE '16, May 14-22, 2016 memory, but also the entire hardware platform including the network, buses, and peripheral devices (e.g., keyboards, USBs, video adaptors). Usually, different devices can be combined to provide a large number of unique platforms.
FSSs are becoming widely used for many purposes in embedded and mobile domains where hardware is diverse, and new platforms are being released at a rapid pace. FSSs are used for tasks including system design, development, testing, debugging and security analysis. This relieves the engineer from having to own many different physical devices, and allows them to adapt quickly during hardware and software evolution. Developers can also interact with the FSS to implement customized tools for their target device, such as test case generators, or they can use additional FSS features such as profiling and provisioning.
Developing a virtual device can be a challenging task. The official documentation of hardware devices often contain inaccuracies and ambiguities [29] , and thus the corresponding software implementation is unlikely to be fault-free. Yet defects in an FSS can have cascading effects. One of the earlier versions (v4.4) of the Android emulator did not rotate screens, preventing developers from testing or debugging any application that rotated [21] . Several studies have shown that software faults in virtual devices can cause security vulnerabilities [2] [3] [4] . For example, a critical vulnerability (called Venom) exists in the virtual floppy disk controller (FDC) code in the Quick Emulator (QEMU) FSS. 1 The fault stems from the FIFO buffer that the virtual FDC simulates to store commands from the CPU. The FIFO fails to reset the index allowing writes by the FDC to overflow. This security fault can propagate to the programs operating on the host platform [3] .
Despite the existence of many automated software testing techniques, applying these directly to virtual devices is not straightforward. First, execution environments require special test drivers. Second, failures are often triggered by interactions between components. Third, failures often do not lead to crashes, making oracles difficult to obtain. Fourth, output states can be masked by input and output data points that are shared.
To overcome these challenges we propose an automated framework, VDTest, that allows engineers to effectively test virtual devices within an FSS. First, VDTest provides a test template generator that extracts basic device properties with little manual effort and uses these to generate test cases. Second, it utilizes a two phase testing approach. The first phase tests the behavior of individual components (e.g., registers and data buffers), and the second phase integrates components, testing for interactions among them. Third, to address the oracle problem, VDTest employs a physical device or a gold-standard virtual device, (also called the oracle device), which leverages differential testing [29, 30] . Finally, to avoid masking effects [13] , VDTest manipulates only necessary input parameters in a test case, leaving inert parameters unchanged. It uses a feedback-driven testing process to identify invalid/ineffective parameters that do not impact the hardware state (e.g., read-only registers), and then enforces constraints to omit these parameters in further iterations.
To evaluate VDTest we conducted an empirical study using 11 pairs of devices, obtained from one physical machine, two open-source FSSs and one commercial FSS. The results show that VDTest is effective at revealing faults; 82.3% more faults were detected than random testing. When compared with a traditional combinatorial interaction testing technique [11] , it reveals 42% more faults given the same testing budget. The contributions of this work are:
• VDTest, a framework for testing virtual devices in an FSS; and
• An empirical study that shows VDTest can find new faults in existing FSS virtual devices, many of which have been confirmed by developers.
In the next section we present a motivating example and background. We then describe VDTest in Section 3. Our empirical study follows in Sections 4 and 5, followed by discussion in Section 6. We present related work in Section 7, and end with conclusions in Section 8.
MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
An FSS sits on top of host operating system emulating all of the hardware for each supported device. It also can run guest operating systems and applications (both of which are normal versions of their respective programs). Figure 1 is a snippet of code extracted from a real virtual device, the PL031 timer device in the QEMU FSS. It contains a bug at line 19 [27] . The interrupt mask bit s->im is incorrectly set. The interrupt status register s->is should be set instead. The result is that interrupt alarms are not fired as expected.
The first challenge is that testing this code requires special test drivers -the execution environment must be properly modeled. For instance, I/O interface functions (i.e., entry functions) such as pl031_write on line 1 are invoked by the FSS to pass inputs to the virtual device. And the device transaction functions such as pl031_set_alarm (line 4) are invoked to perform I/O commands that may fire interrupts by calling qemu_set_irq (line 20).
Second, the function (line 16) containing the faulty statement can not be executed unless certain bits are set in both the data load register (RTC_LR) and interrupt mask (RTC_MR) register. As such, interactions between device components must be considered when testing a virtual device.
Third, faults often fail to propagate their effects to program outputs (e.g., crash). In such cases, output-based test oracles are inadequate. Thus, internal oracles are needed that allow engineers to inspect internal device states (e.g., register values) for correctness. Such states are referred to as observable output points [8] . In Figure 1 the results of RTC_LR and RTC_MR registers are observable output points. 
Figure 1: Example virtual device code
Finally, the observable output points are often the same as the input points, so they can be masked by an input value written to the same point. The input register components (RTC_LR and RTC_MR) are also used to observe device state. Setting the inputs of RTC_LR may affect the output of RTC_MR (line 7). If both registers are set with input values, the output effect of RTC_MR may be masked by its input.
These issues motivate our need for a special testing framework for virtual devices. Figure 2 illustrates a typical I/O system with peripheral devices (the gray area reflects the devices and their I/O memory). A peripheral device is a device that is connected to a computer but is not part of the core computer architecture (e.g., CPU, motherboard and memory). It is controlled by reading and writing to its registers either within the memory address space (memory-mapped I/O) or the I/O address space (port-mapped I/O). For memory-mapped I/O, the device registers are mapped into the CPU's address space. Thus, the device is accessed in the same way as a regular memory access. For port-mapped I/O, I/O device registers have a separate address space from the CPU address space. Thus, the device is often accessed through a special class of CPU instructions (e.g., inb and outb in X86).
Virtual Devices
Most devices have at least two types of registers. The first type is the data register, through which the input/output data is read from or written to the device. The second type is a control register, which selects and shows the mode of operations of the device. Certain bits in the registers are write-only or read-only. A device can also have data buffers that temporarily store the data from the CPU or its peripheral devices. Other devices interact with it, for example, the UART device use a FIFO buffer to transmit and receive data from the CPU.
In this work we are concerned with virtual peripheral devices, hence when we use the term virtual device we are referring to those which are peripheral.
Device Modeling
We represent a generic device D as a 5- 
Test Oracle Modeling
An expected device state can be used as a test oracle. The most accurate way to obtain this state, is to use a hardware oracle and to compare the output (i.e., state) of the DUT to the state of its corresponding physical device. In the case of non-existing physical devices, an alternative approach is to use a well-developed virtual device from another FSS to conduct differential testing [29, 30] . It is also possible that no readily available oracles exist, when a device is newly designed for example. VDTest can still work in this context, presumably the device specifications can be converted into test oracles. In any of the above cases, the artifact (i.e., a physical device, a device model from other FSSs, or a device specification) that can produce an expected output state is considered a golden device, denoted by Do in this paper.
VDTEST
We introduce VDTest whose architecture is shown in Figure 3 . The dark gray boxes contain the major components: a static analyzer, a test case generator, and an output differ. VDTest first employs static analysis (SA) to generate test specifications. The static analyzer takes as input the device source code, a pre-defined test template skeleton that specifies device properties (e.g., register address offset), and a user provided annotation plugin. Next, VDTest runs the test generator to translate the test specification into two test driver s, one for the oracle device (shown as part of the Golden System) and the other for the virtual device under test (shown as part of the Target System). The test generator uses combinatorial testing to create test cases.
After test cases are generated, VDTest executes each test case both on the oracle device (i.e., Do) and the DUT (i.e., Dt), using the three types of state transitions described in Section 2.3. Last, the output differ detects and shows the differences between the output of each test case from Do and the DUT. A difference indicates a possible fault in the DUT.
Both the static analyzer and test generator modules are configurable so that we can, for example, use a variant of combinatorial test generation, or perhaps random test generation instead. We can also completely disable the static analyzer and generate test specifications manually in situations when the source code of DUT is unavailable.
We describe each component of VDTest in more detail next. Figure 4 (left) provides a code snippet for the pl050 device from QEMU. The pl050 is a keyboard interface device that directs communications between the CPU and external keyboards. We will use this example throughout the rest of this section.
Test Specification
VDTest utilizes a test specification skeleton, which specifies a list of device properties needed to generate test drivers and test cases. The specification skeleton is defined only once and generic to all DUTs, so engineers do not need to manually write it for each DUT.
A specification skeleton models the basic properties for a DUT, including both mandatory and optional properties. Figure 4 (middle) is an example that presents an overview of the test specification. The device properties are defined as elements (e.g., name). The value of each mandatory property (indicated by " ") and optional property (indicated by " ") is initially set to null by default in the skeleton, and can then be instantiated by the static analysis. The root element device refers to the DUT. There are three properties defined for this element, name, base, and io. The name property defines the device's name, base property specifies the base address of the DUT, and the property io indicates the I/O mapping policy. The elements at the second level refer to the device components, (i.e., registers and data buffers). The children elements under each component specify the properties of the component. In this example, the offset and size elements under the register component, and the address and size under the buffer component are mandatory properties, whereas the other elements are optional properties. Here, specifying input enables VDTest to limit input space to specific values rather than an entire range of the input domain (e.g, 1 -2 16 ). The read-only indicates that the register is a readonly register. The interrupt indicates that writing to the register may affect interrupt status, and thereby the state of interrupt should be checked at the output differ component. The depend specifies components that may have combinatorial effects with the current component. The output indicates that reading/writing the current component may affect other components, such that the current component must be tested individually first.
Static Analysis
The specification skeleton can be instantiated by SA, with the mandatory property values and possible optional property values analyzed and specified. The only manual step is the annotation plugin, which specifies a list of device entry points. The information is provided by users who are supposed to be domain experts. This annotation strategy has been widely adopted by existing static analysis techniques for device drivers [7, 22, 24] . Figure 4 (right) illustrates a sample of annotation plugin for the pl050 code snippet.
The SA module first identifies the base address of the DUT in the system-specific source files which are specified by the file element under pluginsConfig.System. Here the base address is found in arm/versatilepb.c in QEMU for ARM Versatile Platform. The two properties for the root element device are instantiated in the same way.
The register entry points are identified by pluginsConfig.EntryWrReg and pluginsConfig.EntryRdReg annotations, indicating register write and read points. The function specifies the name of the entry function for all registers, the address indicates the variable used for a register address offset, and the value defines the actual data written to a register. The buffer entry points are specified by the pluginsConfig.EntryBuf annotations. The optional buffer property address is often defined by a data structure, which is obtained by analyzing disassembling files.
To identify property values for registers and buffers, VDTest constructs a system dependency graph [10, 19] starting from the entry point of registers and buffers, as shown in Figure 5 . The offset value for a register can be obtained by its definition. KMIDATA is control dependent on offset and its value is 0x008 defined in the header file. The size of input can be obtained by examining the size of value (i.e.,sizeof(uint64 t)). To obtain input values, VDTest tracks value propagation from the entry point to the constant values assigned. In Figure 4 (left), the possible input values of kmiData can be traced to the function ps2_write_keyboard and to the constants 0x00 and 0x05 (line 16 and line 19). The constants are mapped into the input element in the test specification. If the constant value can not be located, the range of the input value is [0, 2 n -1], where n is the register bit size. Since KMICR is control dependent on KMIDATA, the two components are considered to have combinatorial effects on the device state. KMIMR is control dependent on KMICR, but is written by a value. This implies that change of KMICR may affect the output of KMIMR. <address> 0x168 </address> <size> 16 </size> </buffer1> </device> pluginsConfig.System = { name = "pl050_keyboard" file = "arm/versatilepb.c" io = "memory-mapped" interrupt = "qemu_set_irq" } pluginsConfig.EntryWrReg = { function = "pl050_write" address = "offset" value = "value" } pluginsConfig.EntryRdReg = { ... } pluginsConfig.EntryBuf = { function = "ps2_read_data" address = "" value = "PS2Queue.data" } If a register is included in the read entry function (pluginsConfig.EntryRdReg), but is not included in the write entry function (pluginsConfig.EntryWrReg), it is a read-only register. Since read-only registers are independent from other registers, changing them does not affect the device state. Thus, a test case involving interactions between read-only registers and other components can be eliminated. In this example, KMIDATA is writable, so its read-only property is false.
Writing to a device may lead to changing status of interrupts. To determine whether an entry point is associated with the interrupt, we track the data and control flow from the entry point of a register/buffer to the function that can set interrupt status. In this example, writing to register KMIDATA causes pl050 to raise interrupts (line 27). As such, interrupt status is considered as an observable point, which is included in the oracles.
If optional property values cannot be obtained by static analysis, developers can choose to manually add these values. For example, the input property may not be always presented as constants in the program, so engineers can manually select range or specific values as inputs.
Test Driver
VDTest converts the test specification into a test driver (TD). VDTest considers two classes of test drivers, which can be applied to both physical and virtual devices. The first class handles applications running on a machine with operating systems. Since such systems do not allow userlevel programs to access hardware or memory, the TD was implemented as a kernel module used to communicate with the device. Specifically, VDTest maintains an operation table that maps the elements of the test specification (e.g., elements in Figure 4 (middle)) into kernel-level system calls. These system calls are used to communicate with hardware (e.g., ioremap, inb, outb, inl, outl). VDTest then parses the test specification and replaces its elements with the cor- responding system calls by querying the operation table. For example, the attribute io is replaced with ioremap and request_mem_region to allocate I/O port region. Finally, a C file is generated and compiled into the test driver (kernel module). As an example, we refer to the test specification in Figure 4 (middle), which generates the following C snippet:
... ret = ioremap(IO_BASE, io_size); outl(input, IO_BASE + IFLS); ... The second class of TD handles a bare-metal machine (i.e., a computer on which an application is running without the operating system). We distinguish it from the first class because executing test cases does not require calling kernel APIs. In this case, VDTest converts the read and write operations with respect to specific memory addresses from the test specification into a TD source file.
Testing Approach
VDTests testing approach is guided by the test generator and output differ and works both with test cases and test oracles. We show its main algorithm in Figure 6 . The algorithm VDTest takes a DUT (Dt) and an oracle device (Do) as its inputs, and outputs the faults (denoted as F ) detected in the DUT. 
for each read-only register R in Dt 8:
verify R against Do 9: endfor 10:
for each non-read-only register R in Dt 11:
UnitTest(R ) /*test at unit-level*/ 12: endfor 13:
IntegrationTest T C1 = computeTC(R, 1) /*strength-1 tests*/ 18:
for each test tc ∈ T C1 19:
while t > 1 and t < N 26:
T Ct = computeTC(R, t) 27:
for each test tc in T Ct 28: while t > 1 and t < N 36:
for each test tc ∈ T Ct 38: This is important as test cases are not independent. A test case can change the state of the hardware, so two test cases may yield different hardware states, even if both are identical. After setting the initial state, the algorithm verifies the read-only registers specified in the test specification (line 8).
To do this, for each such register in the oracle device, the algorithm flips all its bits. If the state remains unchanged, the register is truly read-only, otherwise a fault is reported. Next, the algorithm begins with unit-level (Phase 1) testing for each non-read-only register (lines 10-12). It then proceeds to integration-level (Phase 2) testing for the whole device taking inputs as a set of registers that have potential combinatorial effects (line 13). Both phases use a combinatorial testing approach.
Unit-level Testing
The Phase 1 testing tests individual components of DUT (lines [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . The components that are not tested are left in their original state. As such this is analogous to unit testing. Since the data buffer does not contain parameters like registers, its content is randomly generated at this level. As for the registers, each t-bit combination in a register is flipped at least once, where t is the strength of testing. The test cases generated by flipping bits are done by ComputeTC. This is related to fault injection [25] , but applied in a different context. The algorithm begins with testing using strength 1 (line 17). A strength-1 test case for register i is defined as tci,1 = S0ˆ(1 << j), whereˆis the exclusive OR operation and j is the position of the bit to be flipped while other bits in the register stay unchanged. This is important because the input and observable output points on a hardware device are the same, so writing values to any of these points may prevent errors contained in such points from being observed at the output. Each test case is executed on both Dt and Do using the write state transition (line 19). The algorithm then compares the resulting states of Dt and Do (line 20). Note that the change of one device component may affect the states of other components, so the state comparison is done at the entire device-level, including interrupt controller if the interrupt property is set to true in the test specification. For example, flagging bits in IER register changes the value of IIR register in the same device, as well as the interrupt controller. After the write state transition is done, the algorithm performs a read state transition from S to S to check whether DUT correctly simulates the self-clearance registers (line 21). If an observable difference is found, a fault is reported (line 22).
VDTest next enables incremental strength-t testing, where t is increased up to N , the maximum strength determined by the testing budget allocated for phase 1 (lines 25-31).
Integration-level Testing
The objective of the Phase 2 testing is to test interactions among registers and data buffers (lines 33-50). We focus on registers that have potential combinatorial effects, denoted by R[C], which are specified in the test specification under the register element and its depend property. Like Phase 1, the data buffer values are randomly generated. A strength-t combinatorial testing at the integration level aims to test value combinations of each t registers in R [C] . Here, the test cases generated for each register at the Phase 1 are its values. For example, the STAT register (example used in Phase 1) has four values. Similar to the Phase 1 algorithm, the registers not contained in the new combination remain in their original states. Suppose we have a strength-2 test suite created for a DUT that contains four registers -R1, R2, R3, and R4, where R2 is read-only (i.e., no need to be combined with others) and the depend property of R3 is [R1, R4]. Thus, R[C] = {R3, R1, R4}. There are three combinations to be covered -(R1, R3), (R1, R4) and (R3, R4) in Phase 2. The algorithm separates out the test cases that can yield device state change and adds them into T C t ; T C t is further used to generate stateful test cases.
Next, the algorithm generates stateful test cases (test sequences) to test consecutive state transitions. Given a test length l and stateless test cases from Phase 1 (T Cp1) and Phase 2 (T C t ), the algorithm iteratively selects l test cases to form a stateful test case ts and adds it into SEQ (line 45). This is done by selecting only stateless cases that induce changes in the first two phases rather than the exhaustive set of permutations of all stateless tests (line 40). Note that a test sequence is an ordered event sequence, because changing the order of the state transitions may bring the device into a different state. Suppose R1:0xb and (R1:0xa, R3:0xb) are two test cases generated from Phase 1 and Phase 2 respectively, and both yield state changes. The two stateless test cases form two test sequences with length 2 -R1:0xb -> (R1:0xa, R3:0xb) and (R1:0xa, R3:0xb) -> R1:0xb.
EMPIRICAL STUDY
To assess VDTest we explore three research questions. RQ1: How effective is VDTest at detecting faults in realworld virtual devices?
RQ2:
To what extent does the use of oracle device in VDTest affect its effectiveness? RQ3: What types of faults can VDTest detect?
The first research question evaluates whether the VDTest approach is cost-effective in terms of fault detection. The second research question lets us further investigate whether the use of an oracle device can improve VDTest's effectiveness. The third research question allows us to study the faults and classify them into different categories.
Objects of Analysis
To obtain objects of analysis, we used virtual devices from three FSSs that are widely used in both industry and academia -Simics [14] , QEMU [5] , and GEM5 [6] . Simics is a commercial virtual platform. with no source code provided. In this case, the test specifications were written according to the specification manuals by a graduate student who has three years experience in embedded system development. QEMU and GEM5 are two open source FSSs, containing 30K and 287K non-comment lines of code in the device codebases, respectively. To evaluate VDTest, we need both DUTs and oracle devices. We searched virtual devices that are contained in at least two FSSs with respect to their device models. Eight virtual devices matched this criteria. All are based on the ARM architecture. We used the eight VDs in GEM5 as DUTs, and the VDs in QEMU as oracle devices, because QEMU is more widely used. Each DUT is paired with an oracle device, resulting in eight pairs of objects. Additionally, given the availability of physical hardware, we also selected two VDs from Simics and one from GEM5 as DUTs for which we had hardware, and use their corresponding physical devices as oracle devices. Together there are eleven pairs of analysis objects selected, as shown in Table 1 , column 1 (VD). Table 1 provides the characteristics of each device and pair, The notation X-Y in parentheses indicates a pair of DUT (X) and its oracle device (Y ), where "P" indicates a physical machine, "S" indicates Simics, "G" indicates gem5, and "Q" indicates qemu. We give the number of registers (REG, column 2) and buffers (BUF, column 3).
Other columns are described in Section 4.3. UART8250 is an integrated circuit implementing the interface for serial communications. DEC21143 is a fast Ethernet LAN controller providing a direct interface to the PCI bus. DEC21143 has 19 configuration registers, 18 command and status registers (CSRs) and 4 CardBus status changed registers; we consider only CSRs because the other registers are filled with pre-defined values. PL011 is a UART device for the ARM architecture. PL031 is a real time clock device used to provide a basic alarm function or as a long term base counter. PL050 is a Keyboard/Mouse Interface. SP804 is a DualTimer module that can generate interrupts on reaching zero. A9SCU is a snoopy control unit that connects processors to the memory. PL110 is a Color LCD Controller that provides control signals to interface directly via a variety of color and monochrome LCD panels. i8254 is an Intel interval timer device designed to solve the common timing control problems in microcomputer system design. It is used to bring down the timing frequency to customized levels. mcrtc, short for mc146818rtc is a Real-Time clock with alarm and one hundred year calendar, a programmable periodic interrupt and square-wave generator, and a static RAM.
Variables and Measures
Independent variable. Our independent variable involves the testing techniques used. In addition to VDTest, to address RQ1 we enable two testing techniques -a combinatorial interaction testing approach (CIT) [11] and a random testing approach (Random). Test suites generated by CIT contain every combination of t input parameters at least once in the test suites. In our context, the input parameters in Phase 1 are bits and those in Phase 2 are register and buffers. While CIT may be less expensive than the VDTest engine (it generates fewer test cases), by maximizing input parameter coverage in each test case, it neither eliminates masking effects nor prunes independent options. In addition, CIT does not generate stateful test cases without additional modeling.
Like VDTest, CIT was applied in two phases, to generate tests for both individual registers and for the whole device. We generated two different sets of CIT test cases. For the first (denoted as CIT1), we used the same testing strengths as used in the VDTest; this lets us examine the relative effectiveness of the two approaches on equivalent strengths. For the second set (CIT2), we used the same testing time required by VDTest and generated multiple test suites; this lets us examine the relative effectiveness of the approaches when each is given the same amount of testing time.
We also use a random testing technique (Random). Random has been well studied as a baseline approach for traditional CIT techniques [32] . Test cases are generated by randomly changing the bit values of registers and buffers. Like CIT, we generated two sets of Random test cases. The first (denoted as Random1) used the same amount of testing time required by VDTest. The second (denoted as Random2) used the number of test cases in the first set multiplied by 100 (to give random a higher chance of success). This lets us examine how the effectiveness of the VDTest test generator compares to that of a more robust random testing process.
To address RQ2, we disabled the oracle devices and used only observable outputs as oracles (i.e., output-based oracles). This includes exceptional behavior that results in program crashes and error messages (e.g., missing functionality, invalid memory access). We compared VDTest with oracle devices to those with only output-based oracles, denoted by VDTestno.
To address RQ3, we manually classified fault types. We classified the faults into five categories. The first category (C1) are initialization faults, in which device registers/buffers are initialized with incorrect values. The second category (C2) is when we have an incorrect property of single register bits. For example, we use C2 when a read-only bit is writable and a reserved bit changes its status during testing. The third category (C3) was used when incorrect functionality of a device component/bit was affected by the component/bit actually being written. For example, when writing to register A leads to an incorrect state of register B. The fourth category (C4) is used for missing functionality -certain features in the device are not implemented. The fifth category (C5) are faults that are interaction faults -they are triggered by at least two device components/bits.
Dependent variables.
As dependent variables, we measure the effectiveness in terms of the fault detection. We compare the numbers of unique faults (determined by inspecting source code) detected by test cases for each technique, VDTest, CIT1, CIT2, and Random1 and Random2.
Study Operation
We conducted our experiment on a physical X86 machine (the physical devices used in our study) and three FSSs that can simulate both X86 and ARM machines (the virtual devices used in our study). Each X86 physical/virtual machine runs a preemptive Linux kernel version of Fedora Core 2.6.15. The ARM machine is bare-mental, which means it does not come with an operating system. We chose Linux because it runs on a wide range of known architectures, which makes it possible to, with small modifications, extend the VDTest to the hardware on other architectures. In addition, the popularity and complexity of the x86 and ARM architectures make it easier to port VDTest to other architectures. On the simulated machine, we used the programming interfaces that FSSs provide, which allow us to directly control and observe the hardware states. However, other virtual platforms such as OVPsim [34] can also be used to instantiate the framework. The static analyser is built on CodeSurfer [10] using the system dependence graph (SDG). We implemented a plugin module that takes as input the Annotation Plugin and Test Template Skeleton along with the SDG to generate test specifications. We enabled both data dependencies and control dependencies to track data and control flow from device entry points.
On the FSSs, the execution engine is a built-in module, which takes the test driver to exercise test cases by writing and reading registers and hardware buffers. We implemented the execution observer as external modules attached to FSSs. The APIs provided by FSSs allow us to observe system states at arbitrary point. On the X86 physical machine, the execution engine is the operating system, which executes the test driver as a kernel module. We implemented the execution observer by using source code instrumentation (i.e., printk) to log device states into a file.
To implement the testing process of VDTest, the maximum testing strength in the first phase is set to 3 and that in the second phase is left at 2. The length of the test sequence l is set to 2. The insight behind choosing the strengths is the observation that in most cases the appearance of a failure depends on the combination of a small number of parameter values of the DUT [23] .
Returning to Table 1 , we show the details of our test generation. Column 5 (Nd) lists the number of test cases generated by VDTest. Columns 6 (T d ) reports the time required for running these test cases in minutes. Columns 7 and 8 (NC1 and NC2) list the number of test cases generated by CIT1 and CIT2 respectively. We used the ACTS [1] tool to generate CIT test cases. For each of the two CIT techniques, we set the same strengths as used in VDTest (i.e., 3 for the first phase and 2 for the second phase). Column 9 (NR1) and Column 10 (NR2) list the number of test cases generated by Random1 and Random2.
All four techniques involve randomization, therefore we ran each ten times. In addition, as the buffer value is randomly set, the effectiveness of the tests depends not only on the registers but also on the actual content of the buffers. As such, for each test (register configuration), we run it ten times with different random buffer values. In total, then, we conducted 100 runs for each of the four techniques.
Threats to Validity
The primary threat to external validity involves the representativeness of our programs. Other programs may exhibit different behaviors and cost-benefit tradeoffs. The programs we investigate are from several popular FSSs and the faults we aim to detect are real. Another threat is when choosing a virtual device as the oracle, it does not always guarantee that the oracle device is correct. This threat can be controlled by selecting more robust FSSs as oracles.
The primary threat to internal validity is possible faults in the implementation of our approach. We controlled for this threat by extensively testing our tools and verifying their results against a smaller program for which we can manually determine the correct results. A second source of potential threats involves test oracles used. Any deviations from the oracle devices are reported as failures. It is possible that the oracle devices may contain faults that may lead to the report of false positives. We controlled for this threat by using robust FSSs. We also confirmed the deviations with developers on both sides. It is possible that the deviation between DUT and physical device does not mean a real fault, but it is just because that the testing on the physical device result in nondeterministic results due to irregular state of other hardware components (e.g., cache, scheduling, lack of memory, etc). We controlled this threat by running each technique multiple times.
Where construct validity is concerned, numbers of faults detected are just two variables of interest. Other metrics such as the cost of manual effort could be valuable. Table 2 reports the results observed (the cumulative faults detected) in our study; we use this table to address our first two research questions. 2 The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of faults detected in Phase 2. The numbers in brackets are the standard deviations across runs. Table 2 reports the number of faults detected by VDTest. VDTest detected 64 real faults. We reported the deviations between gem5 and qemu to the gem5 developers and the faults were confirmed although priorities and fixes have not yet been implemented. We also reported the faults in Simics, but because we are using an academic version, there is limited support and were not able to get a confirmation.
RESULTS

RQ1: Effectiveness of VDTest. Column 2 of
Columns 3-4 in Table 2 report the numbers of faults detected by the two sets of CIT techniques (CIT1, CIT2). As the data shows, CIT1 detected 42 faults and CIT2 detected three more faults. All 45 faults detected by CIT techniques were also detected by VDTest. VDTest detected 19 additional faults. On eight pairs (out of eleven), VDTest detected more faults than CITs, with improvements ranging from 33.3% to 100%. These results show that the VDTest is more effective at detecting faults than traditional CIT.
As shown in Column 5 and Column 6 of Table 2 , the two Random test suites together detected only 34 faults. Compared to VDTest, VDTest was more effective in nine out of eleven subject pairs (all except a9scu(G-Q) and i8254(gq)), with fault detection improvement ranging from 50% to 133.3%. These results show that the VDTest is substantially more effective than Random.
RQ2: Effectiveness of Device-based Oracles. Column 7 in Table 2 reports the numbers of faults detected without an internal oracle VDTestno. Of the 64 faults detected by VDTest, VDTestno revealed only 23 faults. Clearly, device-based oracles substantially improved the fault detection effectiveness, compared to observable output-based oracles. We further examined the data and discovered that all 23 faults were related to missing features that led to output errors or crashes (i.e., observable faults). For example, when the test case tried to write to an unimplemented register in gem5, an error "writing to invalid memory" was generated, followed by program termination.
RQ3: Fault Categorization. 11 faults (17%) belong to the initialization (C1:Init category). For example, the initial values of two registers (RIS and FR) in the PL011 are inconsistent with those in golden devices. Six out of 64 (10%) faults, belong to the C2:bits error, these stem from incorrect implementations of specific bits (i.e., read-only, write-only and reserved bits). For example, on UART8250 in Simics, the values of two read-only registers, IIR and MSR, were changed unexpectedly by some test cases. The write-only register THR is expected to return zero, whereas the device returns a non-zero value. A few reserved bits 3 in DEC21143 do not respond when they are written. The writes to the reserved bits changed the register values while these bits were not modified in the physical device.
16 faults (25%) belong to the C3: incorrect functionality category, and are caused by incorrect implementation in the virtual devices. For example, the writes to the IER register of the UART8250 returned different values than the physical device did. The reason is that the IIR register in the UART8250 did not react to the change of the interrupt bits. The reason is because the automatic self-clearance mechanism was not implemented for the IIR and LSR registers. On the device pl031, when LR register is written, MR register is updated to the same value as LR as, but the golden device did not update MR. On device DEC21143, in a few cases, the device failed to enable interrupt bits when the receiving and transmitting processes were stopped, but the golden device did. On device SP804, when the 7 th bit is set to 1, the CD register was not changed but the golden device did.
Nine faults (14%) are caused by C4:missing functionality. For example, the FIFO buffer in the UART8250 on GEM5 is missing. Three registers (RSR_ECR, DMACR, and LPR) in PL011 are not implemented.
Finally, there are 22 faults (34%) that we classified as interaction faults C5: Interaction category, of which 9 faults were detected at the register level, and 13 at the device level. For example, on Simics UART8250, the interaction fault occurred in the FIFO data buffer. This buffer was not enabled when the associated registers (IIR and FCR) were set. A few interesting faults occurred due to interactions among registers and interrupts. On DEC21143, the device can raise early interrupts -right after a frame has been put to the internal transmit FIFO buffer. The device failed to trigger the interrupt on these early interrupts.
Of the 22 interaction faults, ten faults were detected by the test sequences (i.e., stateful test cases) from VDTest, and only 5 faults were detected by CIT (also detected by VDTest). This indicates that exercising consecutive state transitions contributes to enhancing the effectiveness for testing virtual devices. We also observed the differences when changing the order of stateless test cases in a test sequence. For example, a fault occurred in PL011 when executing a stateful test case (DR:0x40, IMSC:0x20) -> ICR:0x20. The first stateless test case (DR:0x40, IMSC:0x20) changed the values of the RIS and MIS registers and the status of the interrupt controller PIC. A fault occurred because executing second stateless test case ICR:0x20 did not revert the bit values in MIS and PIC to their original values as the golden device did. This fault was not detected when the order of the two stateless test cases were flipped in the sequence. In fact, interrupts are sensitive to the order of state transitions.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine the influence of several tunable Combinatorial testing strength. We further examined our data to assess the effects of combinatorial testing strengths. For each DUT, we increased the strength of Phase 1 testing to 4 and that of Phase 2 to 3. With the new testing strengths, one more interaction fault was revealed at Phase 2 for devices of PL110 and DEC21143. Specifically, on PL110, the BGP register was not updated but the golden device did when certain values in three registers were set. On DEC21143, the transmit process did not function correctly when three registers were set at the same time. An implication of this discovery is that strength matters more to programs with larger number of registers. Thus, higher testing strength may be recommended to test such programs.
Test sequence length.
To investigate whether the length of a test sequence can affect the effectiveness, we increased the length l from 2 to 3. No additional faults were detected. We further examined the data and discovered that all ten faults detected by the test sequences involve less than three stateless test cases. While additional studies may be needed to generalize the results, based on our current discovery, length 2 is sufficient.
False identification of register properties. There are two registers in the Simics FSS -one in each of UART8250 and DEC21143 devices, that were incorrectly specified as read-only registers. Because we did not have source code, we were unable to identify the read-only registers statically and during testing we prematurely assumed these registers were read-only in the oracle device (line 8 in the algorithm of Figure 6 ). For example, when multiple registers share the same I/O port (e.g., UART chip), the read-only register can become writable when certain bits are set in other control registers. Without exhaustively permuting register bits, it is impossible to precisely determine read-only registers.
RELATED WORK
There has been work on testing embedded systems using simulators [18, 20, 35] . However, these techniques take advantage of FSSs rather than test FSSs. While specificationbased testing techniques [17] can be used to find cases in which the virtual device does not behave consistently with what has been defined in its hardware specifications, obtaining well documented, reusable, and accurate specifications can be difficult. By using the golden oracle, our approach does not rely on hardware specifications.
Cong et al. presented a technique to analyze behaviors of virtual device models [12] and detect the differences between virtual and physical devices. In later work, they extend the technique to a commercial software tool [26, 37] . Their approach leverages symbolic execution to explore states of virtual devices in qemu. However, their approach is limited as all symbolic execution engines are, and does not generate integration test cases or stateful test cases. As shown in our study, a large portion of faults are interaction faults that can only be detected by combinatorial test cases. In addition, their technique does not generate test specifications. Engineers need to annotate and instrument source code for each virtual device. Ormandy et al. [33] use random testing to detect security vulnerabilities in the implementation of virtual machines. The author also shows several interesting examples on security faults caused by incorrect implementation of virtual machines. However, this work does not have a systematic testing approach for virtual devices such as test drivers, unit and integration testing, and test oracles.
The idea of differential testing [30] has been used in a variety of contexts, including flash file systems [16] and CPU emulators [29] . Martignoni et al. [28, 29] utilize the physical CPU to analyze CPU emulators/virtualizes to find defects in their implementation, however their work focus on the CPU virtualization. In the hypervisor-based VMs they do not take into account the peripheral virtual devices, which are essential to an FSS. Our work instead considers the distinct characteristics of peripheral devices.
In this paper we use ideas and language from combinatorial interaction testing [11, 23, 31] such as the strength of testing and incremental testing [15] . However, we are performing integration testing rather than system testing and only manipulate t parameters at a time.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented VDTest, a framework for testing virtual devices within an FSS. VDTest solves two essential aspects of software testing -test case and test oracle generation while also handling unique characteristics of real hardware devices. The approach is mostly automated and requires little knowledge of hardware specifications. Our study shows that VDTest is effective in detecting real faults. It found 33% more faults than the best variant of CIT and doubled fault detection over random testing. We also found that using stateful testing as well as testing for interactions improved our results. In future work we will develop oracles that detect timing faults, as well as experiment with different levels of granularity in our oracles. In addition, we will perform more extensive experiments.
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